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Abstract
This paper revisits the issue of the optimal exchange rate regime in a ￿ exible price envi-
ronment. The key innovation is that we analyze this question in the context of environments
where only a fraction of agents participate in asset market transactions (i.e., asset markets are
segmented). Under this friction alternative exchange rate regimes have di⁄erent implications
for real allocations in the economy. In the context of this environment we show that ￿ exible
exchange rates are optimal under monetary shocks and ￿xed exchange rates are optimal under
real shocks. (JEL: F1, F2)
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11 Introduction
Fifty years after Milton Friedman￿ s (1953) celebrated case for ￿ exible exchange rates, the debate
on the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes rages on as ￿ercely as ever. Friedman argued
that, in the presence of sticky prices, ￿ oating rates would provide better insulation from foreign
shocks by allowing relative prices to adjust faster. In a world of capital mobility, Mundell￿ s (1963)
work implies that the optimal choice of exchange rate regime should depend on the type of shocks
hitting an economy: real shocks would call for a ￿ oating exchange rate, whereas monetary shocks
would call for a ￿xed exchange rate. Ultimately, however, an explicit cost/bene￿t comparison
of exchange rate regimes requires a utility-maximizing framework, as argued by Helpman (1981)
and Helpman and Razin (1979). In such a framework, Engel and Devereux (1998) reexamine
this question in a sticky prices model and show how results are sensitive to whether prices are
denominated in the producer￿ s or consumer￿ s currency. On the other hand, Cespedes, Chang, and
Velasco (2000) incorporate liability dollarization and balance sheets e⁄ects and conclude that the
standard prescription in favor of ￿ exible exchange rates in response to real shocks is not essentially
a⁄ected.
An implicit assumption in most, if not all, of the literature is that economic agents have un-
restricted and permanent access to asset markets.1 This, of course, implies that in the absence
of nominal rigidities, the choice of ￿xed versus ￿ exible exchange rates is irrelevant. In practice,
however, access to asset markets is limited to some fraction of the population (due to, for example,
￿xed costs of entry). This is likely to be particularly true in developing countries where asset mar-
kets are much smaller in size than in industrial countries. Table 1 shows that even for the United
States, the degree of segmentation in asset markets is remarkably high. The table reveals that, as
of 1989, 59 percent of U.S. households did not hold any interest bearing assets (de￿ned as money
market accounts, certi￿cates of deposit, bonds, mutual funds, and equities). More strikingly, 25
1There are some exceptions when it comes to the related issue of the costs and bene￿ts of a common currency
area (see, for example, Neumeyer (1998) and Ching and Devereux (2000), who analyze this issue in the presence of
incomplete asset markets).
1percent of households did not even have a checking account as late as in 1989. Given these facts for
a developed country like the United States, it is easy to anticipate that the degree of asset market
segmentation in emerging economies must be considerably higher. Since asset markets are at the
heart of the adjustment process to di⁄erent shocks in an open economy, it would seem natural to
analyze how asset market segmentation a⁄ects the choice of exchange rate regime.2
Table 1 here
This paper abstracts from any nominal rigidity and focuses on a standard monetary model of an
economy subject to stochastic real and monetary (i.e., velocity) shocks in which the only friction
is that an exogenously-given fraction of the population can access asset markets. The analysis
makes clear that asset market segmentation introduces a fundamental asymmetry in the choice of
￿xed versus ￿ exible exchange rates. To see this, consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of a positive velocity
shock in a standard one-good open economy model in the absence of asset market segmentation.
Under ￿ exible exchange rates, the velocity shock gets re￿ ected in an excess demand for goods,
which leads to an increase in the price level (i.e., the exchange rate). Under ￿xed exchange rates,
the adjustment must take place through an asset market operation whereby agents exchange their
excess money balances for foreign bonds at the central bank. In either case, the adjustment
takes place instantaneously with no real e⁄ects. How does asset market segmentation a⁄ect this
adjustment? Under ￿ exible rates, the same adjustment takes place. Under ￿xed exchange rates,
however, only those agents who have access to asset markets (called ￿traders￿ ) may get rid of
their excess money balances. Non-traders ￿who are shut o⁄ from assets markets ￿cannot do this.
Non-traders are therefore forced to buy excess goods. The resultant volatility of consumption is
costly from a welfare point of view. Hence, under asset market segmentation and in the presence
2In closed economy macroeconomics, asset market segmentation has received widespread attention ever since the
pioneering work of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984) (see also Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) and
Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001)). The key implication of these models is that open market operations reduce the
nominal interest rate and thereby generate the so-called ￿liquidity e⁄ect￿ . In an open economy context, Alvarez and
Atkeson (1997) and Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) have argued that asset market segmentation models help in
resolving outstanding puzzles in international ￿nance such as volatile and persistent real exchange rate movements
as well as excess volatility of nominal exchange rates.
2of monetary shocks, ￿ exible exchange rates are superior to ￿xed exchange rates.
Asset market segmentation also has crucial implications for the optimal exchange rate regime
when shocks come from the goods market. We show that when output is stochastic, non-traders
in the economy unambiguously prefer ￿xed exchange rates to ￿ exible exchange rates because pegs
provide a form of risk pooling. Under a peg, household consumption is a weighted average of
current period and last period￿ s output which implies that the consumption risk of non-trading
households is pooled across periods. Under ￿ exible rates, however, the real value of consumption
is always current output which implies no intertemporal risk sharing. Trading households, on the
other hand, prefer ￿ exible exchange rates to ￿xed exchange rates since maintaining an exchange
rate peg involves injecting or withdrawing money from traders which makes their consumption
more volatile under a peg. However, trading households￿access to asset markets ensures a much
smaller increase in their consumption volatility relative to the reduction in consumption volatility
of non-trading households. Using a population share weighted average of the welfare of the two
types, we show that under fairly general conditions, the non-traders￿preferences dominate the
social welfare function. Hence, when output is stochastic, an exchange rate peg welfare dominates
a ￿ exible exchange rate regime. In sum, the paper shows that asset market segmentation may be
a critical friction in determining the optimal exchange rate regime.
Our paper is related to an older literature on exchange rate regimes. Perhaps the closest paper
is Fischer (1977) who showed that in an economy with no capital mobility, ￿xed exchange rates
produced better outcomes than ￿ exible exchange rates when shocks are real while ￿ exible exchange
rates are better when shocks originate in the money market. There are two main di⁄erences
between Fischer (1977) and our paper. First, we solve a micro-founded optimizing model while
Fischer obtained his results in the context of a reduced-form model. The reduced-form nature of
the model made his analysis unsuitable for a choice-theoretic welfare analysis. Second, we analyze
an economy with heterogenous agents whereas Fischer did not. In our model, agent heterogeneity
is key to understanding the role of monetary policy in a⁄ecting real outcomes. In our framework,
monetary policy can react to output disturbances by redistributing resources from one agent to the
3other. This channel is critical in achieving the ￿rst-best in our model and is missing completely
in Fischer￿ s model.
In fact, it is this heterogeneity of agents which also di⁄erentiates our work from the work
of Helpman and Razin (1982). Helpman-Razin studied an environment with uncertainty and
incomplete markets to show that ￿ exible exchange rates can produce higher welfare than ￿xed
exchange rates. However, the key feature of our model is incomplete market participation ￿some
agents are absent from asset markets. In a previous version of this paper we have shown that our
results carry over to the complete asset markets case. Hence, what is central for our results is
incomplete market participation, not incomplete asset markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium conditions
while Section 3 describes the allocations under alternative exchange rate regimes and derives the
optimal regime under monetary and output shocks. Section 4 studies the optimal, ￿rst-best
monetary policy rule. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Algebraically tedious proofs are consigned to
an appendix.
2 Model
The basic model is an open economy variant of the model outlined in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber
(2001). Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with world goods markets. There is
a unit measure of households who consume an internationally-traded good. The world currency








where ￿ is the households￿time discount factor, cs is consumption in period s, while Et denotes
the expectation conditional on information available at time t.
The households face a cash-in-advance constraint. As is standard in these models, the house-
holds are prohibited from consuming their own endowment. We assume that a household consists
of a seller-shopper pair. While the seller sells the household￿ s own endowment, the shopper goes
4out with money to purchase consumption goods from other households. We assume that house-
holds are heterogenous. In particular, only a fraction ￿ of the population, called traders, have
access to the asset markets, where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. The rest, 1 ￿ ￿, called non-traders, can only hold
domestic money as an asset. We restrict ￿ to be strictly positive. As will become clearer below,
the model has a discontinuity at ￿ = 0. Since all money injections occur in asset markets, the
monetary authority has no way of introducing money into the economy if there are no traders at
all.
There are two potential sources of uncertainty in the economy. First, each household receives
a random endowment yt of the consumption good in each period. We assume that yt is an
independently and identically distributed random variable with mean ￿ y and variance ￿2
y.3 Second,
following Alvarez et al., we assume that the shopper can access a proportion vt of the household￿ s
current period (t) sales receipts, in addition to the cash carried over from the last period (Mt), to
purchase consumption. We assume that vt is an independently and identically distributed random
variable with mean ￿ v 2 [0;1] and variance ￿2
v. In the following we shall refer to these v shocks as
velocity shocks.4
The timing runs as follows. First, both the endowment and velocity shocks are realized at
the beginning of every period. Second, the household splits. Sellers of both households stay at
home and sell their endowment for local currency. Shoppers of the non-trading households are
excluded from the asset market and, hence, go directly to the goods market with their overnight
cash to buy consumption goods. Shoppers of trading households ￿rst carry the cash held overnight
to the asset market where they trade in bonds and receive any money injections for the period.
They then proceed to the goods market with whatever money balances are left after their portfolio
3We could allow for di⁄erent means and variances for the endowments of traders and non-traders without changing
our basic results.
4There are alternative ways in which one can think about these velocity shocks. Following Alvarez, Lucas, and
Weber (2001) one can ￿ think of the shopper as visiting the seller￿ s store at some time during the trading day, emptying
the cash register, and returning to shop some more￿ . The uncertainty regarding v can be thought of as the uncertainty
regarding the total volume of sales at the time that the shopper accesses the cash register. Alternatively, one can
think of this as representing an environment where the shopper can purchase goods either through cash or credit.
However, the mix of cash and credit transactions is uncertain and ￿ uctuates across periods.
5rebalancing. After acquiring goods in exchange for cash, the non-trading-shopper returns straight
home while the trading-shopper can re-enter the asset market to exchange goods for foreign bonds.




The non-trader￿ s cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
MNT
t + vtStyt = StcNT
t ; (2)
where MNT
t is the beginning of period t nominal money balances while St is the period t exchange
rate (the domestic currency price of foreign currency). Equation (2) shows that for consumption
purposes, the non-traders can augment the beginning of period cash balances by withdrawals from
current period sales receipts vt (the velocity shocks). Notice that while writing (2) we have
assumed that the cash-in-advance constraint binds in equilibrium.5 Appendix 6.1 provides su¢ cient
conditions to ensure that (2) indeed holds for all t.
Money balances at the beginning of period t + 1 are given by sales receipts net of withdrawals
for period t consumption:
MNT
t+1 = Styt(1 ￿ vt); (3)
where St denotes the domestic currency price of consumption goods at time t.
The usual ￿ ow constraint follows from combining (2) and (3):
MNT
t+1 = MNT
t + Styt ￿ StcNT
t : (4)







5Relaxing this assumption will add complexity to our analysis without qualitatively changing or adding any further
insights to the results we obtain. Note further that it is a standard assumption in the literature; see for example
Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), and Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001).
62.1.2 Traders
The traders begin any period with assets in the form of money balances and bond holdings carried
over from the previous period. Armed with these assets the shopper of the trader household visits
the asset market where she rebalances the household￿ s asset position and also receives the lump
sum asset market transfers from the government. Thus, for any period t; the accounting identity
for the asset market transactions of a trader household is given by
^ MT
t = MT











t denotes the money balances with which the trader leaves the asset market and MT
t
denotes the money balances with which the trader entered the asset market. Also, B denotes
aggregate one-period nominal government bonds, i is the interest rate on these bonds, f are foreign
bonds (denominated in terms of the consumption good), r is the exogenous and constant world
real interest rate, and T are aggregate (nominal) lump-sum transfers (i.e., negative taxes) from the
government.6;7 Note that nominal bonds maturing at date t pay an interest rate it￿1 since this
rate was contracted in t ￿ 1.8
After asset markets close, the shopper proceeds to the goods market with ^ MT in nominal money
balances to purchase consumption goods. Like non-traders, traders can also augment these starting
money balances with random withdrawals from current sales receipts to carry out goods purchases.
6We assume that these transfers are made in the asset markets, where only the traders are present. Note that
since B and T denote aggregate bonds and aggegate transfers, their corresponding per trader values are B=￿ and
T=￿ since traders comprise a fraction ￿ of the population.
7The assumption of endogenous lump-sum transfers will ensure that any monetary policy may be consistent with
the intertemporal ￿scal constraint. This becomes particularly important in this stochastic environment where these
endogenous transfers will have to adjust to ensure intertemporal solvency for any history of shocks. To make our
life easier, these transfers are assumed to go only to traders. If these transfers also went to non-traders, then (5)
would be a⁄ected.
8Note that though traders do have access to asset markets, these markets are incomplete. More speci￿cally,
traders do not have access to asset markets where they can trade in state contingent assets spanning all states.
Hence, as will become clear below, random shocks can induce wealth e⁄ects and consumption volatility for traders
as well, despite their access to competitive world capital markets. In an appendix to this paper, we analyzed the
complete markets case and show how the same key results obtain. Hence, our results on the optimal exchange rate
regime under asset market segmentation do not depend on whether asset markets for traders are complete or not.
The appendix is available from the authors upon request.
7Thus, the cash-in-advance constraint for a trader is given by9
StcT
t = ^ MT
t + vtStyt: (7)









￿ (1 + it)
Bt
￿
+ Stft+1 ￿ St(1 + r)ft; (8)
In this set-up the only reason that traders hold money overnight is the separation between
markets. In particular, if the seller could access the asset market at the end of the day, then
the trading household would use all their remaining sales receipts from the period to buy interest
bearing bonds. Thus, period-t sales receipts net of withdrawals become beginning of next period￿ s
money balances
MT
t+1 = Styt(1 ￿ vt): (9)
Note that since v, S; and y are all exogenous, the traders￿money holdings evolve exogenously over
time.
A trader chooses ct, Bt+1 and ft+1 to maximize (1) subject to the ￿ ow constraint (8). Combining
￿rst-order conditions, we obtain:
u0(cT
















Equation (10a) is the standard Euler equation for the trader which relates the expected marginal
rate of consumption substitution between today and tomorrow to the return on savings (given by
1+r) discounted to today. Equation (10b), on the other hand, determines the optimal holdings of
nominal bonds. Equations (10a) and (10b) jointly determine the modi￿ed interest parity condition
for this economy which re￿ ects the standard portfolio choice between safe and risky assets.
9In equilibrium it > 0, which implies that the cash-in-advance constraint for traders always binds. It can be
shown that the su¢ cient conditions for non-traders￿cash-in-advance constraints to bind, derived in appendix 6.1, are
su¢ cient to ensure it > 0 in equilibrium.
82.2 Government
The government in this economy holds foreign bonds (reserves) which earn the world rate of interest
r. The government can sell nominal domestic bonds, issue domestic money, and make lump sum
transfers to the traders. Thus, the government￿ s budget constraint is given by
Stht+1 ￿ (1 + r)Stht + (1 + it￿1)Bt ￿ Bt+1 + Tt = Mt+1 ￿ Mt; (11)
where B denotes the amount of nominal government bonds held by the private sector, h are foreign
bonds held by the government, M is the aggregate money supply, and T is government transfers
to the traders. Equation (11) makes clear that the money supply can be altered in three ways:
through open market operations, through interventions in the foreign exchange market, or through
transfers. Importantly, all three methods impact only the traders since they are the only agents
present in the asset market.
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the money market requires that
Mt = ￿MT
t + (1 ￿ ￿)MNT
t : (12)
The ￿ ow constraint for the economy as a whole (i.e., the current account) follows from combining the
￿ ow constraint for non-traders (equation (4)), traders (equations (7) and (9)), and the government
(equation (11)) and money market equilibrium (equation (12)):
￿cT
t + (1 ￿ ￿)cNT
t = yt + (1 + r)kt ￿ kt+1; (13)
where k ￿ h + ￿f denotes per-capita foreign bonds for the economy as a whole.




Notice that the stock of money relevant for the quantity theory is end of period t money balances
(i.e., Mt+1). This re￿ ects the fact that, unlike standard CIA models (in which the goods market
9opens before the asset market and shoppers cannot withdraw current sales receipts for consump-
tion), in this model (i) asset markets open before goods market open (which allows traders to change
this period￿ s money balances for consumption purposes); and (ii) both traders and non-traders can
access a fraction of current sales receipts.
Combining (3) and (5) gives the consumption of non-traders:
cNT
t =
(1 ￿ vt￿1)St￿1yt￿1 + vtStyt
St
: (15)
To derive the consumption of traders, we use equation (9) to substitute for MT
t in equation (8).
Then, subtracting Styt from both sides allows us to rewrite (8) as












where we have used equation (14) to get Mt+1￿Mt = [(Styt ￿ St￿1yt￿1) ￿ (vtStyt ￿ vt￿1St￿1yt￿1)].
Using equation (11) in the equation above gives
kt+1
￿
￿ (1 + r)
kt
￿










where k0 is given exogenously. Equation (16) gives the trader￿ s ￿ ow constraint in equilibrium.
The left hand side captures the net acquisition of foreign assets (per trader) by the economy while
the right hand side gives periodic trader income net of consumption. Given the precise monetary
regime, we can iterate forward equation (16) and impose the trader household￿ s ￿rst order condition
for optimal consumption (equation (10a)) to derive the trader￿ s policy function for consumption
along a rational expectations equilibrium path.
It is worth noting that the last term on the right hand side of (16) captures the source of
redistribution in this economy. Any changes of money supply occur through central bank operations
in the asset market where only traders are present. Hence, the traders receive the entire incremental
money injection while their own increase in money balances is only a fraction ￿ of the total. This







from non-traders to traders. Note that as ￿ ! 1 this
term goes to zero. It is important to note that this channel exists solely due to asset market
segmentation.
103 Alternative exchange rate regimes
Having described the model and the equilibrium conditions above, we now turn to allocations
under speci￿c exchange rate regimes. We will look at two pure cases: ￿ exible exchange rates and
￿xed exchange rates. The end goal, of course, is to evaluate the welfare implications under the
two regimes. In all the policy experiments below, we shall assume that the initial distribution of
nominal money balances across the two types of agents is invariant. In particular, we assume that
MT
0 = MNT
0 = ￿ M.
In order to make the analytics of the welfare comparisons tractable, we shall also assume from
hereon that the periodic utility function of both agents is quadratic:
u(c) = c ￿ ￿c2: (17)
To focus our results, we shall proceed by analyzing the e⁄ect of each shock in isolation. In
particular, we ￿rst study an environment where the only shock is the velocity shock and then go
to the other case where the only shock is the real shock.
3.1 Velocity shocks only
In this subsection we focus solely on velocity shocks. Hence, we set ￿2
y = 0: Thus, there is no
uncertainty about the endowment process. Every period all households receive the ￿xed endowment
￿ y.
3.1.1 Flexible exchange rates under velocity shocks
We assume that under ￿ exible exchange rates, the monetary authority sets a constant path of the
money supply:
Mt = ￿ M:
11Further, the government does not intervene in foreign exchange markets and, for simplicity, we
assume that initial foreign reserves are zero. Then, the government￿ s ￿ ow constraint reduces to:
(1 + it￿1)Bt ￿ Bt+1 + Tt = 0: (18)
The quantity theory equation (14) determines the exchange rate:
St =
￿ M
(1 ￿ vt)￿ y
: (19)
The exchange rate will thus follow the velocity shock and be high (low) when the shock v is high
(low).
Using (19), consumption of non-traders (given by equation(15)) under ￿ exible exchange rates
can be written as:
c
NT;flex
t = ￿ y ; t ￿ 0: (20)
Equation (20) shows that consumption of non-traders remains constant at all times. Intuitively,
under ￿ oating exchange rates, prices change in proportion to the velocity shocks. Since the velocity
shock is common to all agents, there is no redistribution of purchasing power between agents.
To determine consumption of traders under the ￿ oating exchange rate regime, we can iterate






+ ￿ y ; t ￿ 0; (21)
where we have used the fact that under the quadratic utility speci￿cation adopted above, equation
(10a) ￿which describes the optimal consumption plans for traders ￿reduces to c0 = E0(ct) for all
t > 0. Hence, under ￿ exible exchange rates, consumption of traders is also constant over time.
The intuition is the same as before. Since, prices change in proportion to their velocity shock,
there are no real balance e⁄ects on the traders. Hence, their consumption remains invariant over
time.
123.1.2 Fixed exchange rates under velocity shocks
Under ￿xed exchange rates, the monetary authority sets a constant path of the exchange rate equal
to ￿ S. In particular, we assume that the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed at
￿ S =
￿ M
(1 ￿ ￿ v)￿ y
: (22)
In e⁄ect, we are assuming that at time t = 0 the monetary authority pegs the exchange rate at the
deterministic equilibrium level.
Under this speci￿cation, it is easy to see from equation (15) that consumption of non-traders
under a ￿xed exchange rate is given by
c
NT;peg
t = ￿ y [1 + (vt ￿ vt￿1)]; (23a)
c
NT;peg
0 = ￿ y [1 + (v0 ￿ ￿ v)]: (23b)
Equation (23a) shows that under an exchange rate peg, consumption of non-traders will ￿ uctuate
by the full amount of their velocity shock. Intuitively, velocity shocks change the nominal balances
that non-traders have available for consumption. Since the price level is now ￿xed, any change
in nominal balances also implies a one-for-one change in real balances and, hence, a⁄ects the
consumption of non-traders.
To determine the consumption of traders we again iterate forward on equation (16) by using




























In deriving (24) we have used the fact that under pegged exchange rates, equation (14) implies that
Mt+1 ￿ Mt = ￿(vt ￿ vt￿1)￿ S￿ y.10

























13To understand the consumption function of traders, note that under ￿xed exchange rates,
the nominal value of GDP remains unchanged, i.e., St￿ y = ￿ S￿ y for all t. The quantity theory
relationship requires that aggregate nominal money balances plus the aggregate withdrawal from
current period sales be su¢ cient to purchase current nominal output. To keep nominal output
unchanged over time, any change in cash withdrawals from current receipts, i.e., vt 6= vt￿1, must
be met by the monetary authority with an o⁄setting change in aggregate nominal money balances.
This intervention must happen through transactions in the asset market where only traders are
present. On a per trader basis then, the proportional change in nominal money balances needed
for keeping the exchange rate ￿xed is ￿1
￿(vt ￿ vt￿1). Thus, under ￿xed exchange rates, a velocity
shock of ￿v not only changes real balances of traders by the full amount but also changes their
real balances by ￿1
￿ due to central bank intervention. The net e⁄ect is 1 ￿ 1
￿ which is the term
that shows up in the coe¢ cient on the velocity shocks in equation (24).
3.1.3 Optimal exchange rate regime
Having described allocations under the alternative exchange rate arrangements, we now turn to the
key focus of the paper: determination of the optimal exchange rate regime. We shall conduct our
analysis by comparing the unconditional expectation of lifetime welfare at time t = 0 (i.e., before














; i = T;NT ; j = flex; peg; (25a)
Wj = ￿WT;j + (1 ￿ ￿)WNT;j; j = flex; peg: (25b)
Equation (25a) gives the welfare for each agent under a speci￿c exchange rate regime where the
relevant consumption for each type of agent is given by the consumption functions derived above
for each regime. Equation (25b) is the aggregate welfare for the economy under each regime which
is the sum of the regime speci￿c individual welfares weighted by their population shares. Note





= E(c) ￿ ￿ [E(c)]
2 ￿ ￿V ar(c): (26)
where var(c) denotes the variance of consumption.
Proposition 1 When velocity shocks are the only source of uncertainty in the economy, the ￿exible
exchange rate regime welfare-dominates the ￿xed exchange rate regime for both agents and hence,
is the optimal exchange rate regime for the economy. When all agents in the economy are traders,
i.e., ￿ = 1, the ￿xed and ￿exible exchange rate regimes are welfare equivalent.
Proof. It is easy to see that E(c
NT;flex
t ) = E(c
NT;peg
t ) = ￿ y while E(c
T;flex
0 ) = E(c
T;peg
0 ) = rk0
￿ + ￿ y.
Hence, for both types of agents, expected consumption under the two regimes is identical. However,
V ar(c
T;peg
t ) > V ar(c
T;flex
t ) = 0 and V ar(c
NT;peg
t ) > V ar(c
NT;flex
t ) = 0 for all t. From the
expression for expected periodic utility given by (26), it then follows directly that
Wi;flex > Wi;peg; i = T;NT:





0 = rk0 + ￿ y:
Hence, consumption for traders is identical under both regimes. Moreover, since no stochastic
terms enter the consumption function, welfare of traders (and hence aggregate welfare as well)
must be identical under both regimes.
Intuitively, under ￿ exible exchange rates the adjustment of the price level is proportional to the
velocity shock of both agents. Hence, ￿ exible exchange rates completely insulate the real balances
of both agents which allows them to smooth consumption completely. Under ￿xed exchange rate on
the other hand, a wealth redistribution occurs across agents due to velocity shocks. Speci￿cally,
in order to keep the exchange rate unchanged, the monetary authority intervenes in the asset
market to accommodate the average e⁄ect of the velocity shock. This a⁄ects transfers to traders
which induces redistributions. As a result, consumption of non-traders ￿ uctuates over time while
consumption of traders is a⁄ected by a wealth e⁄ect coming from asset market transfers. Hence,
15for ￿ < 1, welfare under ￿ exible exchange rates is greater than welfare under ￿xed exchange rates
for both agents. Thus, aggregate welfare under ￿ exible exchange rates is unambiguously greater
than under ￿xed rates.
For ￿ = 1, our result is similar to the well known result of Helpman and Razin (1979) who
showed the welfare equivalence between ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates for representative agent
economies with perfect capital mobility where agents are subject to cash-in-advance constraints.
Intuitively, under ￿ exible exchange rates the price level adjusts exactly in proportion to the trader￿ s
velocity shock which leaves her real balances unchanged and thereby insulates her completely from
any wealth e⁄ects due to real balance ￿ uctuations. Symmetrically, when exchange rates are ￿xed,
the monetary authority pegs the exchange rate by exactly o⁄setting the aggregate velocity shock
through a corresponding intervention in asset markets. When all agents are in the asset market, the
intervention amount in asset markets corresponds exactly to the size of the trader￿ s velocity shock
which leaves their real balances unchanged. As in the ￿ exible exchange rate case, this intervention
e⁄ectively insulates traders from any wealth e⁄ects due to their velocity shocks. Hence, the two
regimes are identical from a welfare standpoint.
3.2 Output shocks only
We now turn to the issue of real shocks and their e⁄ects in this model. To focus on this issue, we
assume that vt = ￿ v for all t and ￿2
v = 0. In other words, there is no uncertainty regarding the
velocity realization. However, we now assume that output, yt, is i.i.d. with mean ￿ y and variance
￿2
y.
To analyze the welfare trade-o⁄s under ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates we shall continue to
assume that under ￿ exible exchange rates Mt = ￿ M for all t while under ￿xed exchange rates
St = ￿ S (= ￿ M=(1 ￿ ￿ v) ￿ y):
The quantity theory equation in this case is given by
Mt+1
1 ￿ ￿ v
= Styt:
16Note that Mt = ￿ M implies that under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime, nominal income is constant
over time. Hence, nominal money balances of both types are also constant over time.
The above implies that consumption allocations for non-traders under the two regimes, using
equation (15), are given by
c
NT;flex
t = yt; (27a)
c
NT;peg
t = (1 ￿ ￿ v)yt￿1 + ￿ vyt: (27b)
Note that in deriving equation (27a) we have used the fact St￿1yt￿1 = Styt under ￿ exible rates.
Similarly, iterating forward on the periodic budget constraint for the trading households, equation
(16), and imposing the relevant monetary regime on the result gives the consumption allocations













+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ v))
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yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ v))
￿ | {z }
￿1=r
￿ y: (29)
It is easy to check that E(c
NT;flex
t ) = E(c
NT;peg













￿ + ￿ y.
Hence, expected consumption of both types is identical under the two regimes.
However the variance of consumption is di⁄erent. Speci￿cally,
V ar(c
NT;flex




t ) = ￿2




0 ) = ￿ v2￿2
y < ￿2
y (30c)
Hence, for non-trading households, consumption volatility is lower under a peg relative to a ￿ exible
exchange rate regime. Given that expected consumption is identical under the two regimes while
17volatility is lower under a peg, it follows that non-traders always prefer a ￿xed exchange rate regime
to a ￿ exible rate regime when shocks are real.11
To understand the intuition, note that under ￿ exible exchange rates, a constant path of nominal
money balances implies that the real value of last period￿ s sales (in terms of current prices) is always
equal to current output. Hence, current consumption (which is a weighted average of current and
last period￿ s real sales revenues) is just current output. Thus, the entire variance of current output
is re￿ ected in the variance of current consumption. Under an exchange rate peg on the other hand,
the real value of last period￿ s sales is always last period￿ s output. Hence, current consumption
is a weighted average of last period and current period￿ s output. The resulting lower variance
of consumption under a peg re￿ ects a form of risk pooling: the consumption risk is pooled across
periods.
The variance of consumption of trading households also di⁄ers across the two regimes. In the
















= (t + 1) ￿2
1 ￿2
y; (31b)
where ￿1 is as de￿ned in equation (29). Notice that for ￿ = 1; ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿2 = 0; then













Our welfare metric is given, as before, by equation (25b). In order to compare welfare across
regimes we de￿ne ￿W ￿ Wflex￿Wpeg. Substituting equations (30a-31b) in (25a) and (25b) gives




c2￿2 + c1￿ + c0
￿
; (32)








+2(1 ￿ ￿ v)
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1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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2(1 ￿ ￿ v)
￿
1
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
; c0 = (1 ￿ ￿ v)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 :
11We should note that this result is crucially dependent on the household being able to consume some fraction of
current sales, i.e., v > 0. If v = 0 then c
NT;flex
t = yt and c
NT;peg
t = yt￿1. Hence, both expected consumption and
the variance of consumption would be identical under the two regimes.















for ￿ v > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 When endowment shocks are the only source of uncertainty in the economy and




￿exible exchange rates are optimal for all ￿ < ￿2. When all agents in the economy are traders, i.e.,
￿ = 1, the ￿xed and ￿exible exchange rate regimes are welfare equivalent.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that whenever the share of traders is above a critical threshold, ￿xed
exchange rates are the optimal regime under real shocks. To understand the intuition behind this
result, it is helpful to note that while both types of agents face the same shock, their ability to cope
with them is asymmetric. In particular, trading households have an extra instrument ￿￿nancial
assets ￿with which to smooth out their consumption ￿ ow in response to shocks. Thus, the welfare
losses of traders in shifting from a ￿ exible exchange rate regime to a peg is always smaller than
the corresponding loss of a non-trading household moving from a peg to a ￿ exible exchange rate
regime. Thus, the preferences of non-traders typically dominates the overall welfare criterion.
The only caveat to this intuition occurs for very small values of ￿. In particular, when ￿ < ￿2,
a very small number of trading households have to bear the burden of maintaining an exchange
rate peg for the entire economy by accepting all the monetary injections or withdrawals. Due to
their very small numbers, the resultant consumption volatility of traders under a peg becomes very
large. At the limit, consumption volatility of traders goes to in￿nity as ￿ tends to zero. However,
as ￿2 < r2, the range in which ￿ exible rates are optimal is very small. This suggests that exchange
rate pegs are, in general, the optimal regime under output shocks.12
The welfare equivalence of the two regimes when ￿ = 1 can be understood as follows. Under
12Note that we have imposed the restriction ￿ > 0 throughout the paper. This re￿ ects the fact that from a
monetary policy viewpoint, the model has a discontinuity at ￿ = 0 since the monetary authority has no mechanism
to introduce money into the economy if there are no traders. Hence, the discussion above applies only to ￿ strictly
greater than zero.
19￿ exible exchange rates there are no monetary injections or withdrawals. On the other hand, to
maintain a peg, the government either injects or withdraws money through open market opera-
tions. These transfers however are entirely internal to the economy and, hence, do not a⁄ect the
(exogenous) income stream of the economy. In either regime, the trading households smooth their
consumption through asset markets. As the economy￿ s income stream is identical under the two
regimes, and as all agents are identical, the Ricardian equivalence implies that the allocations will
also be identical.
4 Optimal monetary policy
Having compared ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rate regimes, an obvious question is whether there
are other welfare superior policy rules. In particular, what is the ￿rst-best monetary policy in this
environment?
An e¢ cient ￿rst-best allocation under the model￿ s environment requires that ex-post the mar-
ginal utility of consumption be equalized across all agents. This in turn implies that the consump-
tion of traders and non-traders be equal, i.e., cT
t = cNT
t for all t. Recall that the trader￿ s optimal
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The above must hold with probability one; therefore, it will also hold under expectations. Using the




t = rkt + (1 ￿ ￿)yt + ￿￿ y (33)
We now need to ￿nd the money growth rate ￿t that can implement the ￿rst-best. To do so, rewrite
20the non-trader￿ s ￿ ow constraint (4) as
cNT






From the money market equilibrium, MNT
t+1 = Mt+1 = (1 + ￿t)Mt = (1 + ￿t)MNT
t . Then using






Combining (33) with (34) yields
￿t =
￿ (yt ￿ ￿ y) ￿ rkt
￿ y + ryt ￿ vt￿￿1yt + rkt
For expositional convenience, let us consider the case with kt = 0. Then
￿t =
yt ￿ ￿ y
￿ y + ryt ￿ vt￿￿1yt
(35)
A few features of this policy rule are noteworthy. First, since the monetary authority chooses ￿
after observing the realizations for y and v, this rule is implementable. Second, equation (35)
makes clear that when there are no shocks to output, i.e., yt = ￿ y for all t, the optimal policy is
to choose ￿t = 0 for all t independent of the velocity shock.13 But this is precisely the ￿ exible
exchange rate case. Hence, under velocity shocks a ￿ exible exchange rate regime with a constant
money supply implements the ￿rst-best allocation.
A third interesting feature of equation (35) is that the optimal monetary policy is procyclical.




￿ y (1 + r)(1 ￿ vt)
(￿ y + ryt ￿ vt￿￿1yt)2 > 0:
Note that the latter inequality above follows from the fact that v is strictly bounded above by
one. The intuition for this result is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in output raises consumption
through two channels. Current sales revenue rise and hence raise the cash available for consumption.
13When k0 = 0, and yt = ￿ y for all t; (13) and (33) imply that kt = 0 for all t; thus ￿t = 0 is indeed the ￿rst-best
policy for all t.
21Moreover, an increase in output appreciates the currency thereby raising the real value of money
balances brought into the period. To counteract these expansionary e⁄ects on consumption, the
optimal monetary policy calls for an expansion in money growth so as to depreciate the currency
and thus in￿ ate away the nominal gains. Fourth, the optimal policy response to velocity shocks




yt(yt ￿ ￿ y)
￿(￿ y + ryt ￿ vt￿￿1yt)2 R 0:
Thus, when output is above the mean level, an increase in v calls for an increase in money
growth while if output is below the mean then the opposite is true. Intuitively, an increase in vt
has two opposing e⁄ects on real balances available for consumption. First, it raises real balances
through appropriating a higher proportion of current sales. Second, a higher vt depreciates the
currency thereby deceasing the real value of money balances brought into the period. When output
is equal to the mean level, absent a change in policy, these e⁄ects completely neutralize each other.
On the other hand, when output is above (below) the mean, the current sales e⁄ect is stronger
(weaker) than the exchange rate e⁄ect. Hence, an increase (decrease) in ￿ provides the appropriate
correction by depreciating (appreciating) the currency.
5 Conclusion
The determination of the optimal exchange rate regime for an open economy is one of the oldest
issues in international economics. While there exists a very long and old literature on this topic,
most of the work in this area has been conducted in the context of environments with some sort of
nominal rigidity ￿either in wages or in prices. In this paper we have studied an entirely di⁄erent
environment wherein the key friction is in asset markets. In particular, we have analyzed a model
in which only a fraction of agents trade in assets. In this environment ￿xing exchange rates
entails central bank interventions in the asset market where only a fraction of agents are present.
Hence, monetary shocks (shocks to velocity in our context) under ￿xed exchange rate regimes
cause redistributions across agents thereby generating consumption volatility. On the other hand,
22when exchange rates are ￿ exible, monetary shocks cause changes in the price level which insulate
agents￿real balances. Thus, asset market segmentation causes an inherent welfare bias towards
￿ exible exchange rate regimes when shocks are monetary. On the other hand we have also found
that when the economy faces output shocks, under fairly general conditions, ￿xed exchange rates
unambiguously welfare dominate ￿ exible rates.
It is worth nothing that while we have derived the optimal state contingent money growth
rule which implements the ￿rst-best allocation in this economy, we have not undertaken a detailed
qualitative and quantitative comparison of state-contingent rules with optimal non-state contingent
rules which would also include the Friedman rule. This is an interesting research topic and is the
focus of attention in a related paper (Lahiri, Singh, and VØgh (2004)).
We have also ignored the issue of endogeneity of market segmentation. In particular, one
would expect that agents endogenously choose to be traders or non-traders with the choice being
sensitive to the cost of participating in asset markets as well as the prevailing exchange rate and/or
monetary regime. However, we see no reason to believe that this would change our key results. As
should be clear from the intuition provided in the paper, what matters for our results is that, at
every point in time, some agents have access to assets market while others do not. What particular
agents have access to asset markets and whether this group changes over time should not alter the
essential arguments. A formal check of this conjecture is left for future work.
236 Appendix
6.1 Su¢ cient conditions for binding cash-in-advance constraints for non-traders:
At each t, the non-traders maximize (1) subject to their period t budget constraint (4) and
MNT
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ vt) St yt: (36)
The above equation can be interpreted as the e⁄ective cash in advance constraint: if in any
period the non-traders do not exhaust the within-period cash available for consumption, the cash
remaining at the end of the period then must exceed the RHS. The optimality condition can then
be summarized by










= if Mt+1 > (1 ￿ vt)Styt;
> only if Mt+1 = (1 ￿ vt)Styt;
: (37)
Thus for the cash in advance constraint to always bind in equilibrium (37) must hold with inequality
for all t. Below, we consider ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rates alternately and establish su¢ cient
conditions that ensure that cash in advance constraints bind under both velocity and output shocks.
6.1.1 Flexible exchange rates
Velocity shocks only Here, cNT = ￿ y. Using (19) with (37) implies that the CIA will always
bind if
1 ￿ vmax
1 ￿ ￿ v
> ￿ (38)
Output shocks only Here, cNT = yt. Using (14) with (37) implies that the CIA will always
bind if ￿
y ￿ 2 ￿ y2￿
min
￿ y ￿ 2 ￿
￿
￿ y2 + ￿2
y
￿ > ￿ (39)
246.1.2 Fixed exchange rates
Velocity shocks only Here St = St+1 = ￿ S, and cNT
t = ￿ y (1 ￿ vt￿1 + vt). Then (37) implies that
the CIA will always bind if
1 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ y [1 ￿ vmin + vmax ]
1 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ y [ 1 ￿ vmax + ￿ v]
> ￿ (40)
Output shocks only Here, cNT
t = (1 ￿ vt￿1)yt￿1 + vtyt. Then (37) implies that the CIA will
always bind if
￿
1 ￿ 2 ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿ v) ymax + ￿ v yt]





Establishing su¢ cient conditions requires imposing restrictions on the shock processes. For the
utility speci￿cation c ￿ ￿ c2, let ￿ = 0:2. Let the output and velocity processes be uniformly
distributed as y 2 [0:96;1:04] and v 2 [0:18;0:22]. This approximately implies a % standard
deviation of 2.5 for the output process and 6% for the velocity process. Then for ￿ = 0:96 it is
easily checked that (38) - (41) are satis￿ed
6.2 Expressions for variances under output shocks




























y ￿ 2 r ￿2Cov[kt;yt￿1]; t ￿ 1 (42b)







1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ )
￿ | {z }
(￿1+￿2)=r
yt ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿




1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v + ￿ ￿ )
￿ | {z }
￿1=r
￿ y




































= (t + 1) ￿2
1 ￿2
y; for all t.
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= (t + 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿2
y
Using the above expression, the variance term of traders￿life-time utility under ￿ exible exchange
rates is obtained as
￿￿￿2
y: (46)
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Notice that the expected consumption of both traders and non-traders are equal under the two
regimes. Hence the di⁄erence in welfare solely arises due to the variance component. The welfare
26gain, Wflex ￿ Wpeg; as de￿ned in (32), thus can be obtained by using (30a) - (30c) with (44) and
(46) to yield
￿W = Wflex ￿ Wpeg = ￿ ￿
"￿







































(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (47)
0
@￿ ￿







































6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The proposition follows directly from (47) where it is easy to see that ￿W ? 0 i⁄ for ￿ 7 ￿2, and
￿W = 0 for ￿ = 1:
27Table 1: US Household ownership of ￿nancial assets, 1989
Interest-bearing assets
Checking account No Yes Total
No 19% 6% 25%
Yes 40% 35% 75%
Total 59% 41% 100%
Source: Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000). Data from the Survey of Consumer Finance.
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